Posts Tagged ‘Middle East Peace Process’

The Gospel according to Jim Krane: Dubai as savior of the Middle East, Palestinians

Monday, September 7th, 2009

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Dubai in the 1960s.

Dubai in the 1960s.

Over at Steve Clemons’s The Washington Note, guest poster Jim Krane whipped up a storm last week by claiming that Dubai offers up an ideal model, one that other countries in the region should emulate. Call it the “Arabs need to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps” theory. I’m actually having a really difficult time trying to summarize the post, which is just all over the place, but I’ll give it a shot anyway:

  • The U.S. is prolonging the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and otherwise bringing destruction to the region.
  • The U.S. can’t fix the Middle East. The U.S. didn’t help Dubai. Arab countries need to serve their own interests.
  • How?  Follow Dubai’s business-before-politics model. Don’t bother trying to help the Palestinians or complaining about Israel.

Then, watch how Krane parries the straw-man counterargument!

But wait, Dubai is in financial trouble. How could it be a role model?

Dubai’s downturn is temporary. Being one of the world’s most globalized cities, it couldn’t help but be infected by a global recession. The contagion kneecapped each one of its economic pillars: Shipping, logistics, tourism, and its binging real estate sector. Most of these pillars remain sound.

I guess he meant to say temporarily kneecapped? Bit of a strong word for something that remains “sound.”

The whirlwind, logic-free tour continues, with a reminder of the controversy from 2006 when a Dubai-based firm bought the operations of some U.S. ports.

Then we arrive at my favorite part of his incoherent evangelism:

The Dubai model is a mixture of social freedom, unbridled immigration, and raw capitalism. It is overseen by a government that is one of the world’s least democratic. This is no accident. Dubai avoids both elections and the Arab obsession with politics, especially the syndrome of feeling slighted by the West.

The writing is, if you haven’t been able to tell already, a train-wreck. “Unbridled immigration”? I suppose by unbridled he means to say unregulated and prone to coercive practices. Near the end, he concedes that the labor market is “abusive,” the dependence on the real estate market is crippling, and “raw capitalism” and its attendant consumerism also mean unbridled pollution and general deterioration of the environment.

But let’s ignore all that, and focus on the best part of Dubai: it is undemocratic, so it doesn’t have to deal with pesky elections or ideas of citizenship that demand engagement and involvement from the people of the country. Instead, citizenship in Dubai is predicated purely on transfers of wealth and privilege from the government to its citizens.

If Dubai wasn’t autocratic, think of how terrible it would be! Guest workers would (hopefully? eventually?) have a voice, or at least the ability to advocate for themselves without being subject to arrest.

Putting aside arguments about the inherent strengths and weaknesses of democracy, it’s absolutely daft to call Dubai a model that could be replicated elsewhere in the Arab world. I’m sure that if the Palestinians had a booming real estate market and large petroleum/natural gas reserves, the Emirati self-help model would serve them well. But as it stands, I don’t think the Gazans can count on tourism to fix their problems.

Obama as magician: prospects for a Middle East peace deal

Friday, August 21st, 2009
Obama rolls up his sleeves in preperation for pulling a coin out of Egyptian President Mubarak's ear. For his next trick, he will pull from thin air a peace deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

President Obama rolls up his sleeves in preperation for pulling a coin out of Egyptian President Mubarak's ear. For his next trick, Obama will pull from thin air a peace deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Lest I be accused of painting too bleak of a picture of prospects for the Middle Eat peace process (which Aaron David Miller, depressingly and convincingly, did already in a recent interview with IPF), I wanted to share some more reassuring thoughts from Scott Lasensky, in another recent interview with IPF. The interview is worth reading in its entirety, so I’ll point you to it here.

But there are three sections particularly worthy of attention. The first:

Much has been made of Israeli attitudes toward President Obama in recent weeks. How concerning should this be for the administration? How can it be overcome?

LASENSKY: The issue has been totally overblown. Don’t be fooled, there’s no crisis in U.S.-Israel relations. Apologies to those former advisors to Bush or Sharon who are trying to whip up a maelstrom. There’s been a lot of heated rhetoric, especially from the Israeli side, but this will soon pass, as cooler heads prevail.

Israeli politics are a blood sport, just read the Israeli press or watch a Knesset debate. Some Israeli political figures have taken to act similarly toward President Obama and members of his Administration, which is a mistake, and they are quickly learning how self-defeating such an approach can be, especially on an issue like settlements, which the Israeli public long ago abandoned.

I wasn’t too certain about this point; however, excepting for the latter half of the final sentence, it seems about right. The Israeli public is extremely divided on the settlement issue; a much trumpeted poll in June concluded that  a majority (at 56%) of Israelis support settlements, but it seems this was a bit of a push poll. After Obama’s Cairo speech, the same exact percentage said Netanyahu should freeze settlements. A different poll by the INSS in Israel said 75% of Israelis support removal of illegal outposts:

Forty-two percent of the public oppose expansion of the settlements, while 41 percent support further development of the settlements, “but not if it will result in a confrontation with the United States”; only 17 percent support further settlement activity “irrespective of the American position.”

These findings suggest that government can count on extensive public support should it decide to forcefully remove the unauthorized outposts after attempts to reach agreement with the occupants are exhausted. Overall, the issue of settlements continues to divide the Israeli public. However, the vast majority of the public does not want a confrontation with the United States over this issue. The government can expect public support should it decide to curtail settlement activity as part of a wider understanding with the United States.

One of the other disheartening recent developments was Aluf Benn’s op-ed in the nytimes, in which Benn, Israeli lefty and editor of Haaretz, said Obama is to blame for the peace process stalemate since he has not been talking directly to the Israeli people–choosing Cairo over Tel Aviv, in effect. Lasensky has a great point to make on that charge.

First, if President Obama succeeds in rebuilding America’s standing in the Arab and Muslim world–and in rebuilding America’s leadership position more broadly in the international arena, it will be hugely beneficial to Israel. When America’s power and influence are diminished, as they were in recent years, it’s bad for Israel.

It’s something that’s not always easy for Israelis to see–i.e. to take the wide angle approach–given the immediacy of their threats and the proximity of their enemies, but it’s a fundamental truth.

Another recent argument is that American requests for a settlement freeze amount to unjust pressure on Israel, which is then resisted and thus ultimately counterproductive. Lasensky?

Two, we’ve now learned just how incapable Israeli governments are when it comes to tackling the settlements question on their own — just read the government and military inquiries and reports, or take note of the court decisions. The late Zeev Schiff, the dean of Israeli strategic experts and defense writers, recognized some time ago that without American pressure, Israelis would continue to shoot themselves in the foot.

And, finally, onto the most important issue, the stalemate:

Three, on a certain level, it’s fair for Israelis to ask “what’s in it for us,” should they accede to Washington’s request for a settlements freeze. For this reason, it’s critical that the Administration comes up with a deal where everyone gives and everyone gets, Israelis, Palestinians and the Arabs—which is what I think they are doing.

Here we reach the crux of the matter. I’ll leave it to the final questiona and answer. I just hope Lasensky is right.

Despite being rebuffed in public appearances, Special Envoy George Mitchell has insisted that Arab states are ready to make gestures toward Israel. What kind of gestures can the US expect the Arab states to make - and do you expect the Arab world to do so without an Israeli settlement freeze?

LASENSKY: The intensity of the claims and denials by all sides suggests to me that something important is taking place behind the scenes. All this public posturing signals that there may be far more movement than commonly understood.  Arab states will be pleasantly surprised at the reaction in Israel should they decide to step forward. The impact of gestures, even symbolic ones, can create more political space for Israeli leaders. Many leaders in the Arab world probably view Netanyahu and his government with deep suspicion–not to mention an Arab political culture of caution and prudence. So the trick for the Obama Administration will be to choreograph a process whereby everyone moves at the same time, and no one appears to be giving away bargaining chips for free.

Whether it be slight of hand or saving face, this is just crazy enough to work. Stay tuned.

Updates and retreads on the Middle East Peace Process

Friday, August 21st, 2009
Palestinian P.M. Fayyad

Palestinian P.M. Fayyad (Haaretz)

In the interest of getting a little more comprehensive, to give a broader sense of what’s going on with the peace process, I’ve plucked a few compelling narratives from around the region.

For America & Egypt, CFR fellow Steven A. Cook sees rapprochement after Mubarak’s recent visit to D.C.:

The importance of the visit was in part exactly what you pointed out–that this is President Mubarak’s first visit to the United States since April 2004. There’s an effort on both sides to put the Bush years, which were characterized by mistrust and discord, behind them and to forge a new relationship. And for the United States, that means looking at the U.S.-Egypt relationship in its totality, not looking through the narrow prism of reform and democratic change and holding Egypt to certain benchmarks and conditions based on their progress towards a more democratic and open political system. That was really the major issue that came between the two countries, and what created the discord between them. There obviously were policy differences on Iraq and policy differences on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the perception in Egypt that the United States was interfering in Egypt’s domestic affairs was something that did not sit well with Egypt’s leadership.

The word of the week in peace process affairs seems to be “rut,” which is where Obama acknowledges negotiations are currently stuck. Who is to blame? The ADL says: Mr. President, it’s not settlements. It’s Arab Rejection.

In the meantime, both sides are waiting for the other to go first:

From the Egyptian perspective, they say, “We have a peace treaty with the Israelis, we have security cooperation with the Israelis. Our head of general intelligence, Omar Suleiman, spends a lot of time working to get Lieutenant Gilad Shalit, who was taken by Hamas three years ago, free from capture. What more is it that we can possibly do?” The Arabs, and the Saudis in particular, say, “We tabled this Arab initiative in 2002 that offers Israel full normalization for withdrawal from territories, establishment of a Palestinian state, settlement of the refugee issues, all [issues] related to a final status agreement. What more is it that we can do? We don’t want to give the Israelis something for nothing.” On the other side, the Israelis say, “We’re not going to agree to a settlement freeze because we’re not going to get anything in return.” So everybody wants something and doesn’t want to give something for nothing, and the president is stuck in between these two sides that are not willing to go through the door first.

Jewish settlers watched over by an Israeli policeman in Sheikh Jarrah, East Jerusalem

Jewish settlers guarded by an Israeli policeman in Sheikh Jarrah, East Jerusalem (AP)

Palestinians and Israelis are currently trading the blame for the current stalemate and lack of negotiations. The Palestinians insist that the Israelis must stop settlement construction. So what’s going on in Israel that would stop the Israelis from going first? Howard Schneider for Washington Post says that Israeli P.M. Netanyahu is scoring major points by standing up to American pressure on the settlement issue.

Although Israeli leaders have historically been reluctant to publicly break with the United States for fear of paying a price in domestic support, polls show that Netanyahu’s strategy is working. And that means that after months of diplomacy, the quick breakthrough that President Obama had hoped would restart peace talks has instead turned into a familiar stalemate.

Arab states largely have rebuffed Obama’s request for an overture to Israel until the settlement issue is resolved — a stand that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak emphasized in a meeting with Obama on Tuesday — and the Palestinians have said a settlement freeze is a precondition for resuming negotiations. Meanwhile, the Israeli public seems to have rallied around Netanyahu’s refusal to halt all settlement construction, a backlash that intensified when the Obama administration made clear that it wanted Israel to stop building Jewish homes in some parts of Jerusalem as well as in the occupied West Bank.

The settlement issue is rapidly becoming intractable, and Obama’s position is becoming increasingly vulnerable. Even House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer has weighed in, suggesting that the burden is on the Palestinians to initiate negotiations.

Huckabee at the West Bank settlement of Maaleh Adumim (AP)

Huckabee at the West Bank settlement of Maaleh Adumim (AP)

Meanwhile, construction continues in East Jerusalem, while Mike Huckabee had a party at the disputed Shepherd Hotel, where he stated his opposition of the establishment of a Palestinian state “in the middle of the Jewish homeland,” effectively precluding the consensus two-state solution.

So what’s next? WaPo says that pro-settlement groups have become more vocal, and the future is left unnegotiated:

The two sides are still expected to reach some kind of compromise on the issue, though short of the initial demands made by the White House. Netanyahu is meeting U.S. special envoy George J. Mitchell in London this month, and he expects to meet with Obama when he visits the United States for a U.N. General Assembly meeting in September. Discussion has centered on freezing settlement activity for six months to a year.

So that would put us back in 2003, when the Israelis agreed to freeze settlement construction in accordance with the Road Map. Let it never be said that history is anything but cyclical.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan held an election that’s considered generally successful, while the leading candidates begin disputing election results; Blackwater is still in big business, loading up Predators for attacks in the AfPak region.

Snoop Dogg in Lebanon

Snoop Dogg in Lebanon (AP)

To end on a more positive note, Snoop Dogg rocked the Beirut Forum in Lebanon:

At one point toward the end of Thursday’s 75-minute concert, he rapped, “East side! West side!” as he ran back and forth across the stage in a bright yellow jersey.

Of course, it’s a song about shuttling between the richer and poorer sides of Los Angeles.

But in a country where the Christian East and Muslim West sides of the capital were at war until 20 years ago and continue to eye each other suspiciously, it carried a special resonance.

“Both sides!” he cried out as he held up the Lebanese flag.

When the “two-state solution” is no solution

Tuesday, August 11th, 2009

Borders? What borders?

Robert Malley and Hussein Agha published an op-ed in today’s nytimes, decrying the meaningless of the phrase “two-state solution.” Their arguments rests on pairing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with Khaled Meshal, essentially his Hamas counterpart. Both have recently accepted the need for a two-state solution, but only leads to what the authors call “an existential struggle between two worldviews.”

That so many attempts to resolve the conflict have failed is reason to be wary. It is almost as if the parties, whenever they inch toward an artful compromise over the realities of the present, are inexorably drawn back to the ghosts of the past. It is hard today to imagine a resolution that does not entail two states. But two states may not be a true resolution if the roots of this clash are ignored. The ultimate territorial outcome almost certainly will be found within the borders of 1967. To be sustainable, it will need to grapple with matters left over since 1948. The first step will be to recognize that in the hearts and minds of Israelis and Palestinians, the fundamental question is not about the details of an apparently practical solution. It is an existential struggle between two worldviews.

For years, virtually all attention has been focused on the question of a future Palestinian state, its borders and powers. As Israelis make plain by talking about the imperative of a Jewish state, and as Palestinians highlight when they evoke the refugees’ rights, the heart of the matter is not necessarily how to define a state of Palestine. It is, as in a sense it always has been, how to define the state of Israel.

For Malley & co., the proposed settlement freeze is nice, but meaningless. Even if Netanyahu’s government relents, the settlements must be removed, not frozen, so we’re back at the 1967 borders. But even if we do that, the Spirit of ‘48–the existential struggle–will remain. So, basically, why even try?

What Malley is invoking–the definition of the state of Israel as Jewish, right of return for Palestinian refugees, etc. etc., are what the peace process calls final status issues. To be resolved at the end, that is. And as Malley sees it, there is no reconciling the two positions. E.g., Either Jerusalem is the undivided capital of eternal Israel, or half of it becomes East Jerusalem and the capital of Palestine–and thus divided.

Luckily, Obama’s Mitchell team at State has a better handle on things, re: settlement freeze. What Malley is calling for, in between the lines, is for Israel to concede all their current positions–predominantly, the idea of Israel as a  Jewish state. Proponents of defining Israel as Jewish usually (conveniently?) fail to mention that 20% of Israelis are Christian and Muslim (and Jewish) Arabs.

And while many would agree (including myself) on the need for concessions from Israel (with simultaneous concessions from the Arab states, e.g. normalization of relations with Israel), simply dictating terms to the Israelis won’t work. The Israelis won’t accept it. And then there’s no peace agreement at all.

Negotiation on final status issues must correlate with everyday, on-the-ground improvements in the lives of both Israelis and Palestinians. That’s why the settlement freeze matters.

There is injustice, certainly. But reality is not black and white. Its shades of grey call for an incremental approach, one that works toward resolving final status issues while also improving the lives of the people.

The Oslo approach failed for a number of reasons, but on the practical level–which is where Malley directs his argument–the people didn’t see any change. They saw Palestinians and Arabs concede and compromise, and in the end, the Israelis elected Netanyahu to his first term in the 1990s, on the principle that land for peace would never work. Negotiations cooled pretty quickly after that. The second intifada and Operation Cast Lead in January of this year put an end to the little steps taken toward normalization between Israel and the Arab states following Oslo. It’s easy to say we’re just back to where we started. But now is not the time to give up on the peace process; some things have changed, particularly with the Arab Peace Initiative. Grievances have grown on both sides, but so has experience. We have tried before, and now know what doesn’t work. The only options are to alter the approach and try again, or to give up.

Cynicism is probably warranted, considering the way things have gone before. But let’s try to keep a little bit of hope alive.