The Arctic Sea & the North Korea/Middle East connection

October 18th, 2009
The ship's name may appear to be the North Korean cargo ship, Jin Jon 2, but don't be fooled: it's still the Arctic Sea.

The ship's name may appear to be the North Korean cargo ship, Jin Jon 2, but don't be fooled: it's still the Arctic Sea.

(Part Four, in an apparently never ending series.)

The last time we left off the saga of the Arctic Sea, the crew had been freed by the (once again mighty?) Russian navy–after a bizarre incidence of piracy in European water. But now, you’d think with the alleged pirates thrown into the slammer, the story would end. And yet …

What exactly befell the ship, called the Arctic Sea, is still largely unknown. In fact, nearly eight weeks after it was supposedly liberated by the Russian Navy, the ship is said to remain at sea under military control and has yet to make port for needed repairs. Four members of the ship’s crew have not been able to leave, despite repeated calls by their families for their release.

As if that wasn’t strange enough, one more bizarre tidbit has leaked out: the hijackers tried to change the name of the ship to “Jon Jin 2.” It just so happens that the name, as well as the corresponding identification number, belong to a North Korean general cargo ship. Which looks nothing like the Arctic Sea, and was docked in Angola at the time.

Photographs from the Russian Prosecutor General’s Investigative Committee document the new name, painted on the ship:

Jon Jin 2 -- nope, really, its the Arctic Sea.

The Arctic Sea's masquerade.

The second in in command insists there was nothing but lumber on the ship.

“There was only lumber on board,” Mr. Falin said. “I was personally in all areas and in the ballast tanks. There was nothing else in there. I can say this with 100 percent certainty.”

Perhaps. Hijackers, what do you have to say for yourselves?

The hijackers … continue to deny any wrongdoing, maintaining that they were ecologists conducting research in the Baltic Sea when they encountered inclement weather and sought refuge aboard the Arctic Sea.

Well, I bet those Russian government officials and investigators will give us the straight truth. The government, naturally, maintains that there was nothing but lumber aboard as well, but why would the wayward “ecologists” commandeer this ship in heavily trafficked/policed European waters? Why would Russia send warships on a frantic chase … three weeks after the hijacking? And why would they not let the crew go over a month later, nor let the ship dock? The Russian government line and Choose Your Own Ending to the Tale, after the jump.

Read the rest of this entry »

The backlash against the pimp of Jidda ends with the crack of a whip; Yemenis making movies

October 9th, 2009

Just as a quick update for those wondering the fate of Mazen Abdul Jawad, the Saudi who spoke openly about his escapades on an LBC program over the summer: A Saudi court has sentenced the divorced father of four to five years in prison and 1,000 lashes–for violating the Kingdom’s law against “publicizing vice.” Video of the segment here (knowledge of Arabic helps … but you can get the gist, I think, from the visuals):

In other visual media news, the Yemen Embassy is participating in the Arabian Sights: Contemporary Arab Cinema (starting tonight in D.C., dear readers), with the very first Yemeni-produced movie, according to the press releases/the amazing trailer:

“Yemen’s first locally produced film, An intriguing and compelling plot, An exploration to the price of terrorism”

I’m not exactly sure what the plot will be, but based on the trailer, if you know what Allahu Akbar means, you can get by without knowing Arabic. I’m also left wondering; does first locally-produced film really just mean first government-funded propaganda feature-length propaganda piece? Interesting timing, with the Yemeni government confirming yesterday that “hundreds” of soldiers have been wounded and killed in the fighting against the Houthi in the northern region of Sa’ada.

(HT: BT for the Jawad update.)

The Gospel according to Jim Krane: Dubai as savior of the Middle East, Palestinians

September 7th, 2009

Note: Posting will be more sporadic going forward. Now’s the time, if there ever was one, to hook up Google Reader and add this blog as an RSS feed, so your Reader will magically tell you when I’ve written something new.

Dubai in the 1960s.

Dubai in the 1960s.

Over at Steve Clemons’s The Washington Note, guest poster Jim Krane whipped up a storm last week by claiming that Dubai offers up an ideal model, one that other countries in the region should emulate. Call it the “Arabs need to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps” theory. I’m actually having a really difficult time trying to summarize the post, which is just all over the place, but I’ll give it a shot anyway:

  • The U.S. is prolonging the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and otherwise bringing destruction to the region.
  • The U.S. can’t fix the Middle East. The U.S. didn’t help Dubai. Arab countries need to serve their own interests.
  • How?  Follow Dubai’s business-before-politics model. Don’t bother trying to help the Palestinians or complaining about Israel.

Then, watch how Krane parries the straw-man counterargument!

But wait, Dubai is in financial trouble. How could it be a role model?

Dubai’s downturn is temporary. Being one of the world’s most globalized cities, it couldn’t help but be infected by a global recession. The contagion kneecapped each one of its economic pillars: Shipping, logistics, tourism, and its binging real estate sector. Most of these pillars remain sound.

I guess he meant to say temporarily kneecapped? Bit of a strong word for something that remains “sound.”

The whirlwind, logic-free tour continues, with a reminder of the controversy from 2006 when a Dubai-based firm bought the operations of some U.S. ports.

Then we arrive at my favorite part of his incoherent evangelism:

The Dubai model is a mixture of social freedom, unbridled immigration, and raw capitalism. It is overseen by a government that is one of the world’s least democratic. This is no accident. Dubai avoids both elections and the Arab obsession with politics, especially the syndrome of feeling slighted by the West.

The writing is, if you haven’t been able to tell already, a train-wreck. “Unbridled immigration”? I suppose by unbridled he means to say unregulated and prone to coercive practices. Near the end, he concedes that the labor market is “abusive,” the dependence on the real estate market is crippling, and “raw capitalism” and its attendant consumerism also mean unbridled pollution and general deterioration of the environment.

But let’s ignore all that, and focus on the best part of Dubai: it is undemocratic, so it doesn’t have to deal with pesky elections or ideas of citizenship that demand engagement and involvement from the people of the country. Instead, citizenship in Dubai is predicated purely on transfers of wealth and privilege from the government to its citizens.

If Dubai wasn’t autocratic, think of how terrible it would be! Guest workers would (hopefully? eventually?) have a voice, or at least the ability to advocate for themselves without being subject to arrest.

Putting aside arguments about the inherent strengths and weaknesses of democracy, it’s absolutely daft to call Dubai a model that could be replicated elsewhere in the Arab world. I’m sure that if the Palestinians had a booming real estate market and large petroleum/natural gas reserves, the Emirati self-help model would serve them well. But as it stands, I don’t think the Gazans can count on tourism to fix their problems.

If you build it, will they come? Capital investment in the Gulf

September 1st, 2009
Burj Dubai, the tallest man-made structure in the world. Burj means tower in Arabic.

Burj Dubai, the tallest man-made structure in the world. Burj means tower in Arabic.

Brian Stelter wrote yesterday in the business section of the nytimes about the fallow film production studios in Dubai. Check the great lede:

When the heiress Paris Hilton traveled here in June and July to audition female friends for her show “My New BFF,” her producers had access to state-of-the-art studios and a government eager to import a touch of Hollywood glamour to the Middle East.

But to adhere to the region’s Islamic norms, many of the ingredients in reality TV were taboo: there would be no drinking, no cursing, no dramatic displays of affection. The producers thought about filming a scene at a water park, but passed on the option of dressing the contestants in religiously appropriate swimwear.

I do have to fault the article for relying on the simple equation of Hollywood/America = Sex. After all, not all American films revolved around sex–though if they are set in the Middle East, they’re probably about terrorism and oil.

“Syriana” and “The Kingdom” were both filmed in Dubai (though arguably, that was a win/win for both Dubai and the filmmakers, since it let the filmmakers approximate Saudi Arabia–while Dubai could make themselves look better, at the expense of Saudi’s flaws). But to date, they are the only Western films to be partially made in the Emirates.  I have to wonder, why was “Body of Lies,” a similar political thriller about terrorism, turned down in 2007? Maybe Dubai doesn’t want to get typecast …

This month, the government rejected the request from the producers of the sequel of “Sex and the City,” which was to be partially set in Dubai:

Dubai Studio City’s facilities have been used in 26 feature films, mostly from gulf countries and Bollywood. … In rejecting the request from the producers of the “Sex and the City” sequel this summer, Mr. Sharif said, the authorities took into account “the multicultural fabric of the society and its perceptions.”

According to a government official familiar with the script, its plot lines — with the women coming to Dubai, spending money lavishly and cavorting — were perceived to reinforce negative stereotypes about the region.

Good luck with that. When I was in Doha, and told female (khalijeeat) acquaintances that I had lived in New York City, they immediately asked if it was like “Sex and the City.” Some of them wanted nothing more than to move there and live like Carrie Bradshaw and the rest of them. So are the censoring authorities more afraid of stereotypes of the Gulf, or of their women following the Western example?

And so the article goes, assessing the hurdles to film production in Dubai, including failed co-productions (the abysmal “Shorts,” which just opened to pathetic box office returns in America). The articles focuses on Islamic law and censorship as the principal problem for the Gulf’s investments:

Dubai, its rival Abu Dhabi and other Persian Gulf cities face enormous hurdles as they try to diversify their economies by fostering creativity and becoming entertainment capitals. Chief among those hurdles: they operate under Islamic law. Hollywood does not. So far, the oil-rich countries have proved more able to pay for fancy media productions and to build expensive film facilities than to actually lure production to the Middle East, as economic efforts run up against their traditional values and censorship.

The article also ends on this note:

Even more than the staff issues, enduring issues of censorship may be the most stubborn hurdle for the gulf region — even if, as Mr. Hirschorn jokingly said, “our government censor turned out to be a really nice guy.”

Perhaps that’s part of the problem. Perhaps that’s why (DUH) a Paris Hilton reality TV show probably won’t have much to with the Gulf.

But the real problem in my eyes is not the strict moral codes in the Gulf countries, but the failure of their labor markets. The piece briefly touches on this point:

Some of the other hurdles are logistical. For instance, local requirements for full-time work visas mean that the country lacks a robust freelance market to support productions. Jamal al-Sharif, the executive director of Dubai Studio City, which was founded in 2005 to stimulate the regional film industry, acknowledged that “a vital ingredient for building the film industry is access to talent.”

The current business model of Hollywood is dependent on putting together “packaged” deals. Essentially, every film is established as a singular corporate entity, a one-0ff, a model that requires a lot of flexibility–negotiations must occur between every component part in a film production.

This essentially means that the talent–not just actors, writers, directors, but the production assistants, set designers, everyone beyond the camera and behind the scenes–must be brought in to Dubai for one movie. And then, once the production is over,  everyone goes home–because the countries’ visa laws won’t permit unemployed foreigners to remain in the country.

There is no efficiency involve. The Emirates doesn’t have taxes, but that doesn’t negate the expense required to move an entire production–full of all these moving parts, subject to shifting negotiations–to a country far away. And it’s not like someone can stick around after the filmmaking is done, or if something changes in the negotiations and participants need to shift around–visas in the Gulf countries are subject to strict regulations. Lose your current job, and you must leave.

The Gulf’s labor laws are one of the biggest problems in capitalizing on their outsized capital investments. Places like the Media Zone in Abu Dhabi or Education City in Doha won’t flourish on their own. Regardless of their stellar, expensive facilities, these places actually require even more, continuous investments in human capital. Skilled workers, whether engineers or educators or filmmakers or journalists, must be recruited from the West or other Arab countries and brought over on a case-by-case basis. And once again, it’s not terribly easy to change jobs once you’re in country–don’t count on an unemployment period for job hunting, because even as a Westerner or a fellow Arab, you will be deported.

This is to say nothing of the unskilled laborers, working in the Gulf. For more on them, read this lengthy investigative article I wrote while in Doha. It also delves a little deeper into the problems of the labor laws if you’re curious on that count.

In the end, if the Gulf countries want to make the most of their investments, it’s not the morality laws that need to be changed. It’s the labor laws.

Proportionality and Collective Punishment

August 29th, 2009
A Gazan tunnel in Rafah

A Palestinian tunnel digger in Rafah.

The AP is reporting that an Israeli airstrike killed 3 Palestinians and wounded 7 others inside a smuggling tunnel between Gaza and Egypt, according to a Palestinian Health Ministry official.

The Israeli military said the strike was in retaliation for a mortar attack from Gaza on Monday that lightly wounded an Israeli soldier.

The tunnels are the only way for Palestinians to bring in fuel and other goods (e.g., live animals for fresh meat) because of the Israeli blockade of Gaza. It is rumored that Hamas maintains its own, secret tunnels for importing arms, including the mortars and rockets used to attack Israel. The AP doesn’t specify what exactly these smugglers were doing; however, to my knowledge the Palestinian Health Ministry is not run by Hamas,  therefore the official’s involvement points to civilian smugglers. This is clearly a point requiring more reporting, so take that nugget with a lump of salt.

If the Palestinians were indeed civilians, this is truly beyond the pale. Even if they were militants, the proportionality is both disturbing and telling. The math reads like this:

Wounding an Israeli = Wounding seven Palestinians

If the math stopped there, it would be hard to justify. But to kill 3 additional Palestinians? Taken together, this one incident does a lot to reinforce and instill the perception that Israel does not consider Palestinians to be fellow humans. It also gives Palestinians little cause to extend the same consideration to Israelis. With air strikes like these, Israel does not help itself to reach a negotiable peace.

One of the more uncomfortable aspects of Quentin Tarantino’s latest bloodbath of a movie (Inglourious Basterds) is the unquestioning use of collective punishment. I am most definitely not going to argue that the Nazis were good, wholesome folks; but I think it’s safe to say that not every soldier was a Goebbels, or even an Eichmann, for that matter.

The use of collective punishment, for the people of Gaza, is tangentially related. Except in this example, rather than being soldiers of a nation perpetuating mass genocide, the people of Gaza are civilians–punished by the blockade for the sins of a few.

Iraq and the bipolar media narrative: Ramadan Kareem?

August 25th, 2009
P.M. Maliki looks weary. Bear with the weary, over-the-top opening, I'm trying to illustrate how easily the media slips into this one-sided, overly-pessimistic, elite-dominated coverage.

P.M. Maliki looks weary. Bear with the weary, over-the-top opening, I'm trying to illustrate how easily the media slips into one-sided, overly-pessimistic, elite-dominated coverage.

Iraq is going straight to hell in a hand-basket. The government’s overconfidence in its ability to provide security made it take down key blast walls, which was promptly rewarded with the massive truck bombing of two government ministries. The government blamed the remnants of Saddam’s Ba’ath party and a mysterious man in Syria, broadcasting a purported confession across national television in an effort to staunch the bleeding of its legitimacy. Meanwhile, the Islamic State of Iraq, a Sunni insurgent group, blew up two buses heading from Baghdad to the predominatly Shi’a city of Kut, drawing in shades of renewed ethnic conflict. The AP is reporting that the same Islamic State of Iraq–purportedly an al-Qaeda umbrella group–is claiming responsibility for the ministry bombings, a claim the U.S. military finds highly plausible.

At the center of all this is Maliki and his government–which may not include him in the future. Intra-Shi’a politics and Maliki’s own pragmatic political calculations are threatening to rive the government and markedly increase Iranian influence, which the AP forecasts as a coming storm of conflict.

And here ends the depressive portion of the media narrative. The bottom half of that same AP story leaves open the possibility that all this hubub about Maliki and the rest of the Shi’a coalition is just political maneuvers and posturing–and not, say, the annexation of Iraq by Iran, or another Iraqi civil war.

The WaPo coverage of the same event is more tempered, even positive:

The new alliance and the likelihood that Maliki will be forced have to partner with Sunnis suggest that Iraqi politicians are increasingly willing to cross sectarian lines in the pursuit of power.

Maliki’s exclusion from the alliance was not entirely surprising. Despite his considerable popularity, the prime minister has become a divisive figure, and a recent surge in violence has triggered criticism from Iraqis who view his administration as cocky and incompetent.

Because of the volatile nature of Iraqi politics and the fickleness of alliances, analysts cautioned that the political groupings are likely to change between now and the time the ballots are printed. Alliances could even be redrawn after the votes are tallied.

As severely pessimistic as the AP and nytimes coverage I cited in the first graf is, the other half of the nytimes coverage is positively delightful. It’s interesting that this is also the side of journalism that demands that reporters go out among ordinary people, and talk to them about their daily lives. I’m not sure what that says; maybe politics and political coverage just makes us all feel a bit jaded?

The first is the coincidence that this year, Ramadan has begun on the same day for both Shi’a and Sunna in Iraq.

Ramadan begins after the waxing crescent moon first comes into view, which, according to astronomical calculations, happened in Baghdad at precisely 6:42 p.m. on Friday.

By Islamic tradition, however, the ninth month in the Islamic calendar begins only after religious authorities see the crescent with their own eyes. When Ramadan comes in summer, as this year, the sliver of the waxing moon is invisible for most of the day, and in Baghdad it sets just a half hour after dark, making it an elusive target in the often sandy haze along the horizon.

To make matters more difficult, Shiite religious leaders say they must spot that first crescent with the naked eye. Sunnis allow themselves the aid of binoculars or a telescope, which often gives the Sunni Ramadan a full day’s jump on the Shiite observance.

This year, Iraq’s Sunnis took their cue from Abdul al-Ghafor al-Samaraie, head of the Sunni Endowment, who spotted it on Friday with the unaided eye. “This will unite the religious messages of our two sects and is a good sign,” he said.

Iraq’s Shiites begin observing Ramadan when the howza, the committee of their top ayatollahs, announces that the moon has been spotted. That word came many hours after sunset on Friday, catching many Shiites asleep and unprepared for a predawn breakfast on Saturday.

This is reckoned to be a very good omen, one that augurs cooperation between Sunna and Shi’a.

Since the war began, and with it the widespread arrival of cellphones, Iraqis have grown accustomed to sending congratulatory text messages to one another by the dozens when Ramadan is announced.

Many of the messages read like greeting cards, and some even strike a conciliatory note:

While Ramadan is at our doors,

Let us review the reasons

We became as strangers,

And live peacefully as friends.

The texts serve a practical function, too, warning those who might be asleep or not watching the news that they needed to get up before sunrise to have an early breakfast, girding themselves for the daylong fast ahead.

But with staggered starts for Ramadan, the texts became an annoyance if they arrived on the wrong day. In mixed areas there were arguments over eating and drinking in public. The biggest problem, though, was the Id al-Fitr feast at the end of the month. It is the biggest holiday of the Muslim calendar, and sheep are slaughtered in the streets, a distressing sight to those still fasting.

What wonderful understatement. For those who haven’t experienced Ramadan, or fasted for any reason, it’s surprising how cranky you can get. And understandable how resentful you can be of those who can eat. (As the article notes, the embattled Iraqi Christians will have it much worse this Ramadan, since those who break their fast in public are subject to arrest, even for smoking, and nearly all restuarants have been ordered closed. A bit khaliji, eh?)

The other bright spot in the news is a spot of desert in Anbar province:

A few hours outside Baghdad in the middle of Iraq’s vast western desert is a sight that could understandably be mistaken for a mirage: a long, sandy beach filled with thousands of people swimming and dancing barefoot under the hot sun without apparent care.

A disc jockey — “Mr. D. J.,” he calls himself — is shouting into a microphone over a thumping Syrian dance song and blurts out something remarkable in its ordinariness.

“A shoutout to everyone from Baghdad!” he says in Arabic.

“Yea!” responds the crowd that has gathered around him.

“Everyone from Adhamiya and Sadr City who came from Baghdad, show me what you got!” Mr. D. J. yells, referring to two neighborhoods in the capital — the first almost exclusively Sunni, the second nearly entirely Shiite.

In response, energetic dancing breaks out all around, and Sunnis and Shiites share a rare moment of careless bliss together.

It is amazing, but it is real: for the first time since the outbreak of the sectarian war in 2006, Iraq is enjoying a beach season.

The article is a very fast, great read with lots of telling detail. I suggest you get over to the nytimes and finish it. Don’t miss this piece.

If you want to understand what’s going down in Yemen

August 25th, 2009
Sadah governate in Yemen, where the sixth war in the province is currently unfolding.

The Sa'dah Governate in Yemen, where the sixth war in the province is currently unfolding.

Read Gregory D. Johnsen’s most recent post on Waq al-Waq. He has just returned from Yemen, and the complexity of the situation is a bit overwhelming (and the media coverage of the conflict, a bit underwhelming. Let’s blame the media blackout/crackdown). Forgive me for the long excerpt, but I don’t want to excise and accidentally distort the nuance of his  analysis:

My early thoughts - it is just as dangerous as it is tempting to spout off on issues that are still unfolding - is that the government is attempting to strike hard against the Huthis in an attempt to bring them to their news and force them to negotiate from a position of weakness. I don’t believe there is a military solution to this conflict. That is, I don’t think the Yemeni government can make this problem go away by killing people and destroying things in and around Sa’dah.

But at the same time a tough government campaign in Sa’dah is something that is being watched quite closely by members of the Southern Movement. I have long argued, as many already know, that in my view there is a hierarchy of security crises in Yemen with the threat of Southern secession foremost in the government’s mind followed by the threat from the Huthis and then al-Qaeda.

The government is using the war in the north as a not so subtle and not so coded message to the South, essentially saying: this is what the endgame looks like if you continue on the path that you are on. There are certain red lines that the Yemeni government has and as it feels itself pushed more and more it is reacting, but instead of lashing out against the Southern movement it is sending a loud and deadly warning shot across the bow.

This then allows the Yemeni government to both warn the Southern Movement and hopefully (at least in the government’s calculation dissuade them from more serious demonstrations and violence) while at the same time cracking down on the Huthis, who have gained a bit too much power and too many positions since the July 17, 2008 cease fire was announced.

I have my doubts as to the potential for success of such a strategy, but that is a rough sketch of what I see the government attempting to do at the moment.

Read on for some fascinating history and analysis of the Houthis themseleves.

Troubled times for a Yemeni minority remnant (not the Houthi)

August 24th, 2009
The mass exodus of Yemeni Jews in 1949, a.k.a. "Operation Magic Carpet"

The mass exodus of Yemeni Jews in 1949, a.k.a. "Operation Magic Carpet"

Reuters is reporting that 3 Jewish families are leaving Yemen for Israel, where about 200-300 Jews total live among the nation’s 23 million Muslims.

Rabbi Yahya Yusuf Musa, 31, told Reuters the three families were from Raida, a town about 70 km (45 miles) north of the capital Sanaa, where a Jew was killed in December by a Muslim compatriot who has been sentenced to death for the crime.

Sixteen Yemeni Jews from Raidah moved to Israel in June, including relatives of the victim, Mashaa Yaeesh al-Nahari.

According to the rabbi, who is now living in Sanaa along with 66 other Jewish Yemenis after threats by one of the other prominent Yemeni minorities, the Shi’a Houthi in the north are to blame:

“The Houthis kicked us out,” Musa said, recounting attacks on property, theft of religious books and other abuses. “They gave us 10 days to leave, or they would kidnap and kill us.”

If the allegations are true, it would give credence to the government’s arguments for cracking down on the Houthi, whose periodic insurgency exploded recently.

It’s important to note the government’s role in this saga:

Evacuated to Saada city and then flown by helicopter to Sanaa, the Jews of Al Salem now live in government-supplied housing with a small monthly stipend and food rations.

The government accuses rebels, led by Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, of seeking to restore Islamic rule by the Zaydi imamate which was overthrown in 1962. Zaydis, which belong to a branch of Shi’ism, are a minority in mainly Sunni Muslim Yemen.

Is the government playing its small minority’s woes for politics? It’s very opaque from here. The rabbi’s allegations are eerily similar to the government’s claims about the Houthi in general. I don’t want to draw any unwarranted conclusions without more info, but the government has been pretty extensively involved so far:

Musa said President Ali Abdullah Saleh had looked after the Jews from Al Salem, but said his promise to transfer them from Amran province, where Raida is located, had not worked out.

“Their concern and fears increased day by day. This forced them to leave the country because they had no other option.”

Saleh’s government is publicly supportive of the remaining Jews, as is the main Islamist opposition party, Islah.

“The Yemeni Jews are citizens. They should have their own life as Yemenis,” said Mohammed al-Sadi, the party’s assistant secretary-general. “I prefer for them to stay in Yemen, not move to another country, because they are part of this society.”

The 200-300 embattled Yemeni Jews were once members of a much larger community:

Israel organised the departure of about 50,000 Jews, the bulk of a once-vibrant minority famed for its craftsmen, to the newly created Jewish state in 1949.

Just as an interesting aside about comparative coverage, Haaretz’s republication emphasized in the headline that the Yemeni Jews were subject to “Islamist fervor.” The original Reuter’s headline emphasizes the small and shrinking nature of the Yemeni Jewish population.

(HT: IB)

Obama as magician: prospects for a Middle East peace deal

August 21st, 2009
Obama rolls up his sleeves in preperation for pulling a coin out of Egyptian President Mubarak's ear. For his next trick, he will pull from thin air a peace deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

President Obama rolls up his sleeves in preperation for pulling a coin out of Egyptian President Mubarak's ear. For his next trick, Obama will pull from thin air a peace deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Lest I be accused of painting too bleak of a picture of prospects for the Middle Eat peace process (which Aaron David Miller, depressingly and convincingly, did already in a recent interview with IPF), I wanted to share some more reassuring thoughts from Scott Lasensky, in another recent interview with IPF. The interview is worth reading in its entirety, so I’ll point you to it here.

But there are three sections particularly worthy of attention. The first:

Much has been made of Israeli attitudes toward President Obama in recent weeks. How concerning should this be for the administration? How can it be overcome?

LASENSKY: The issue has been totally overblown. Don’t be fooled, there’s no crisis in U.S.-Israel relations. Apologies to those former advisors to Bush or Sharon who are trying to whip up a maelstrom. There’s been a lot of heated rhetoric, especially from the Israeli side, but this will soon pass, as cooler heads prevail.

Israeli politics are a blood sport, just read the Israeli press or watch a Knesset debate. Some Israeli political figures have taken to act similarly toward President Obama and members of his Administration, which is a mistake, and they are quickly learning how self-defeating such an approach can be, especially on an issue like settlements, which the Israeli public long ago abandoned.

I wasn’t too certain about this point; however, excepting for the latter half of the final sentence, it seems about right. The Israeli public is extremely divided on the settlement issue; a much trumpeted poll in June concluded that  a majority (at 56%) of Israelis support settlements, but it seems this was a bit of a push poll. After Obama’s Cairo speech, the same exact percentage said Netanyahu should freeze settlements. A different poll by the INSS in Israel said 75% of Israelis support removal of illegal outposts:

Forty-two percent of the public oppose expansion of the settlements, while 41 percent support further development of the settlements, “but not if it will result in a confrontation with the United States”; only 17 percent support further settlement activity “irrespective of the American position.”

These findings suggest that government can count on extensive public support should it decide to forcefully remove the unauthorized outposts after attempts to reach agreement with the occupants are exhausted. Overall, the issue of settlements continues to divide the Israeli public. However, the vast majority of the public does not want a confrontation with the United States over this issue. The government can expect public support should it decide to curtail settlement activity as part of a wider understanding with the United States.

One of the other disheartening recent developments was Aluf Benn’s op-ed in the nytimes, in which Benn, Israeli lefty and editor of Haaretz, said Obama is to blame for the peace process stalemate since he has not been talking directly to the Israeli people–choosing Cairo over Tel Aviv, in effect. Lasensky has a great point to make on that charge.

First, if President Obama succeeds in rebuilding America’s standing in the Arab and Muslim world–and in rebuilding America’s leadership position more broadly in the international arena, it will be hugely beneficial to Israel. When America’s power and influence are diminished, as they were in recent years, it’s bad for Israel.

It’s something that’s not always easy for Israelis to see–i.e. to take the wide angle approach–given the immediacy of their threats and the proximity of their enemies, but it’s a fundamental truth.

Another recent argument is that American requests for a settlement freeze amount to unjust pressure on Israel, which is then resisted and thus ultimately counterproductive. Lasensky?

Two, we’ve now learned just how incapable Israeli governments are when it comes to tackling the settlements question on their own — just read the government and military inquiries and reports, or take note of the court decisions. The late Zeev Schiff, the dean of Israeli strategic experts and defense writers, recognized some time ago that without American pressure, Israelis would continue to shoot themselves in the foot.

And, finally, onto the most important issue, the stalemate:

Three, on a certain level, it’s fair for Israelis to ask “what’s in it for us,” should they accede to Washington’s request for a settlements freeze. For this reason, it’s critical that the Administration comes up with a deal where everyone gives and everyone gets, Israelis, Palestinians and the Arabs—which is what I think they are doing.

Here we reach the crux of the matter. I’ll leave it to the final questiona and answer. I just hope Lasensky is right.

Despite being rebuffed in public appearances, Special Envoy George Mitchell has insisted that Arab states are ready to make gestures toward Israel. What kind of gestures can the US expect the Arab states to make - and do you expect the Arab world to do so without an Israeli settlement freeze?

LASENSKY: The intensity of the claims and denials by all sides suggests to me that something important is taking place behind the scenes. All this public posturing signals that there may be far more movement than commonly understood.  Arab states will be pleasantly surprised at the reaction in Israel should they decide to step forward. The impact of gestures, even symbolic ones, can create more political space for Israeli leaders. Many leaders in the Arab world probably view Netanyahu and his government with deep suspicion–not to mention an Arab political culture of caution and prudence. So the trick for the Obama Administration will be to choreograph a process whereby everyone moves at the same time, and no one appears to be giving away bargaining chips for free.

Whether it be slight of hand or saving face, this is just crazy enough to work. Stay tuned.

Updates and retreads on the Middle East Peace Process

August 21st, 2009
Palestinian P.M. Fayyad

Palestinian P.M. Fayyad (Haaretz)

In the interest of getting a little more comprehensive, to give a broader sense of what’s going on with the peace process, I’ve plucked a few compelling narratives from around the region.

For America & Egypt, CFR fellow Steven A. Cook sees rapprochement after Mubarak’s recent visit to D.C.:

The importance of the visit was in part exactly what you pointed out–that this is President Mubarak’s first visit to the United States since April 2004. There’s an effort on both sides to put the Bush years, which were characterized by mistrust and discord, behind them and to forge a new relationship. And for the United States, that means looking at the U.S.-Egypt relationship in its totality, not looking through the narrow prism of reform and democratic change and holding Egypt to certain benchmarks and conditions based on their progress towards a more democratic and open political system. That was really the major issue that came between the two countries, and what created the discord between them. There obviously were policy differences on Iraq and policy differences on the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the perception in Egypt that the United States was interfering in Egypt’s domestic affairs was something that did not sit well with Egypt’s leadership.

The word of the week in peace process affairs seems to be “rut,” which is where Obama acknowledges negotiations are currently stuck. Who is to blame? The ADL says: Mr. President, it’s not settlements. It’s Arab Rejection.

In the meantime, both sides are waiting for the other to go first:

From the Egyptian perspective, they say, “We have a peace treaty with the Israelis, we have security cooperation with the Israelis. Our head of general intelligence, Omar Suleiman, spends a lot of time working to get Lieutenant Gilad Shalit, who was taken by Hamas three years ago, free from capture. What more is it that we can possibly do?” The Arabs, and the Saudis in particular, say, “We tabled this Arab initiative in 2002 that offers Israel full normalization for withdrawal from territories, establishment of a Palestinian state, settlement of the refugee issues, all [issues] related to a final status agreement. What more is it that we can do? We don’t want to give the Israelis something for nothing.” On the other side, the Israelis say, “We’re not going to agree to a settlement freeze because we’re not going to get anything in return.” So everybody wants something and doesn’t want to give something for nothing, and the president is stuck in between these two sides that are not willing to go through the door first.

Jewish settlers watched over by an Israeli policeman in Sheikh Jarrah, East Jerusalem

Jewish settlers guarded by an Israeli policeman in Sheikh Jarrah, East Jerusalem (AP)

Palestinians and Israelis are currently trading the blame for the current stalemate and lack of negotiations. The Palestinians insist that the Israelis must stop settlement construction. So what’s going on in Israel that would stop the Israelis from going first? Howard Schneider for Washington Post says that Israeli P.M. Netanyahu is scoring major points by standing up to American pressure on the settlement issue.

Although Israeli leaders have historically been reluctant to publicly break with the United States for fear of paying a price in domestic support, polls show that Netanyahu’s strategy is working. And that means that after months of diplomacy, the quick breakthrough that President Obama had hoped would restart peace talks has instead turned into a familiar stalemate.

Arab states largely have rebuffed Obama’s request for an overture to Israel until the settlement issue is resolved — a stand that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak emphasized in a meeting with Obama on Tuesday — and the Palestinians have said a settlement freeze is a precondition for resuming negotiations. Meanwhile, the Israeli public seems to have rallied around Netanyahu’s refusal to halt all settlement construction, a backlash that intensified when the Obama administration made clear that it wanted Israel to stop building Jewish homes in some parts of Jerusalem as well as in the occupied West Bank.

The settlement issue is rapidly becoming intractable, and Obama’s position is becoming increasingly vulnerable. Even House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer has weighed in, suggesting that the burden is on the Palestinians to initiate negotiations.

Huckabee at the West Bank settlement of Maaleh Adumim (AP)

Huckabee at the West Bank settlement of Maaleh Adumim (AP)

Meanwhile, construction continues in East Jerusalem, while Mike Huckabee had a party at the disputed Shepherd Hotel, where he stated his opposition of the establishment of a Palestinian state “in the middle of the Jewish homeland,” effectively precluding the consensus two-state solution.

So what’s next? WaPo says that pro-settlement groups have become more vocal, and the future is left unnegotiated:

The two sides are still expected to reach some kind of compromise on the issue, though short of the initial demands made by the White House. Netanyahu is meeting U.S. special envoy George J. Mitchell in London this month, and he expects to meet with Obama when he visits the United States for a U.N. General Assembly meeting in September. Discussion has centered on freezing settlement activity for six months to a year.

So that would put us back in 2003, when the Israelis agreed to freeze settlement construction in accordance with the Road Map. Let it never be said that history is anything but cyclical.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan held an election that’s considered generally successful, while the leading candidates begin disputing election results; Blackwater is still in big business, loading up Predators for attacks in the AfPak region.

Snoop Dogg in Lebanon

Snoop Dogg in Lebanon (AP)

To end on a more positive note, Snoop Dogg rocked the Beirut Forum in Lebanon:

At one point toward the end of Thursday’s 75-minute concert, he rapped, “East side! West side!” as he ran back and forth across the stage in a bright yellow jersey.

Of course, it’s a song about shuttling between the richer and poorer sides of Los Angeles.

But in a country where the Christian East and Muslim West sides of the capital were at war until 20 years ago and continue to eye each other suspiciously, it carried a special resonance.

“Both sides!” he cried out as he held up the Lebanese flag.